A modified X-band radar system designed to detect aircraft during atmospheric lidar operations is described and characterized. The capability of the radar to identify aircraft approaching from a variety of directions was tested, and first detections were found to occur between the Ϫ10 and Ϫ3 dB perimeters of the gain horn's antenna pattern. A model based on the radar equation projects the performance of the radar for different sizes of aircraft and at different altitude levels. Risk analysis indicates that the probability of accidently illuminating an aircraft with the laser beam during joint lidar-radar operations is low.
Introduction
Lidar systems are a mainstay of modern atmospheric remote sensing and are used for routine measurements of clouds, 1,2 aerosols, 2 water vapor, 2 temperatures, 3 ozone, 4 gravity waves, 5 and layered phenomena. 6 Although there have been recent advances in the development of eye-safe aerosol systems, 7 high-power short-wavelength laser transmitters will continue to be needed for many applications. Special care must be taken to avoid illuminating aircraft with these lasers owing to eyesafety concerns. 8 In this paper we describe a modified X-band radar that can be used as an aircraft-protection device for atmospheric lidar systems. Nearly identical radars were implemented and used at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) Haystack Observatory Firepond Optical Range (42.6°N, 71.5°W) and at the Dalhousie University Atmospheric-Optics Laboratory (44.6°N, 63.6°W), and they are based on earlier systems developed at Langley Research Center. 9, 10 The effectiveness of the radar was tested by using helicopters and jet aircraft equipped with Global Positioning Systems (GPS) to identify the locations of initial and final detection at various altitudes. The results, described in Section 3, show that the radar system first detects aircraft between the Ϫ10 and Ϫ3 dB perimeters of the gain horn's antenna pattern. In all cases the radar alarm warning time far exceeds the time required for automated shutoff of the laser beam.
A model based on the radar equation is fit to the data and used to predict the performance of the radar against aircraft of different sizes and flying at different altitudes. A risk analysis shows that the radar system reduces the probability of accidently illuminating an aircraft to low levels.
During lidar operations, visual observers are sometimes used to identify aircraft overhead and to interrupt laser transmissions. However, experiences using radars and visual observers simultaneously indicate that even trained and diligent observers miss jet aircraft flying at high altitudes, particularly during the day. This aircraft-protection radar is presented as a reference implementation in the hope that it can help address the safety and licensing considerations of other lidar systems. The lidar-radar combinations described here were approved for use at their respective sites by the Federal Aviation Administration, the Department of Defence U.S. Air Force Frequency Management Agency, and the North American Aerospace Defense Command-United States Space Command in the U.S., and in Canada by Transport Canada, NAV CANADA, Industry Canada, Health Canada, and Shearwater Air Force Base.
Instrumentation
Specifications for the laser transmitters used in the lidars at MIT Haystack Observatory 11 and Dalhousie University 12 are given in Table 1 . Both lidars use powerful Nd:YAG lasers that transmit an expanded beam vertically. Neither beam is powerful enough under the beam expansion to damage an aircraft directly. Although both laser beams are safe to view from the side, they constitute an eye-safety hazard at any reasonable distance for direct on-axis viewing. 8 The requirement of aircraft protection necessitated the development of a suitable radar safety system, and nearly identical radars were implemented at both locations. The transmitter chosen was the Furuno 1942 Mark 2 radar, which is a 6 kW X-band marine radar designed for fishing boats and pleasure craft; the manufacturer's specifications are given in Table 2 . The radar comes equipped with a displaycontrol console and emits an audible alarm when targets are detected in a user-defined "guard zone."
The standard antenna for this radar is a rotating center-fed waveguide slotted array, which is a type commonly seen on fishing vessels. The standard antenna directs the radar beam horizontally, and so it is not sensitive directly overhead, which is the region of primary importance for zenith-pointing lidars. A better approach is to replace the standard antenna with a gain horn aimed coaxially with the laser beam. We chose a Narda Model 640 standard gain horn, with specifications given in Table 3 .
The gain pattern of the horn was measured at the MIT Lincoln Laboratory Antenna Test Range, and is presented in Fig. 1 . As seen in the figure, the horn has a mean Ϫ3 dB beam width of 21.25°and Ϫ13 dB sidelobes in the H plane at 36°from the beam axis.
After removing the standard antenna and rotary joint from the radar, one may bolt the horn directly to the transceiver inside the radar. A photograph illustrating the assembly is given in Fig. 2 . A clear plastic enclosure sealed to the radar chassis is used to cover the horn and protect the radar internals.
In the standard configuration a magnetically activated switch is used to synchronize the rotation of the antenna with the display-control electronics. Because the rotary joint (and therefore the switch mechanism) is removed, a 555 timer circuit is used to communicate synchronization pulses at the required rate ͑0.4 Hz͒; a copy of the circuit schematic can be obtained by e-mailing T. Duck. The radar console still operates as if the antenna is rotating, and so target echoes appear as circles on the console's display. The radius of the circle may be measured to determine the target's range. With use of the gain horn, the conical radar beam completely encloses the laser beam, and aircraft encroachment into the detection perimeter results in an audible alarm. The alarm signal can be used to automatically interrupt laser operations. For the case of the Nd:YAG lasers described here, the signal is used to disable the laser Q switch. The flashlamps in the laser are allowed to continue firing so that the laser heads remain at a stable operating temperature while lasing is disabled. Lasing is not resumed until the radar alarm stops sounding and the airspace is visually confirmed to be clear. Confirmation by eye is an important component of an aircraft-protection strategy.
During operations, ground clutter returns are observed in the first few kilometers of the radar's range. These echoes are removed by using the "A͞C SEA" (sea anticlutter) control on the radar console, which reduces the sensitivity of the receiver in the near field, while employing full sensitivity at greater distances.
Measurements
To test the effectiveness of the radar as an aircraftprotection device, we conducted a series of experiments by using aircraft of different types. Each aircraft was equipped with a GPS receiver and a radio transceiver, and the pilot was instructed to fly over the radar site at a variety of altitudes and from several directions. When the radar alarm indicated a detection, the radar operator directed the flight copilot to record the aircraft's position. The location where the aircraft exited the radar beam was also measured. For each experiment, the radar was operated in the 0.8 s-600 Hz mode so that measurements could be obtained up to 15 km in altitude. Results from the Dalhousie University experiments are presented here, and the MIT Haystack Observatory results are similar.
The first experiment was conducted with a Sikorsky S76 helicopter, and overpasses were completed between altitudes of 457 and 1371 m. The mean ground speed of the aircraft at the lower level was 43.4 m͞s and was 49.7 m͞s at the upper level. The locations for aircraft detections at each altitude are shown in Fig. 3 , along with circles representing the Ϫ3 dB, Ϫ10 dB, and sidelobe antenna perimeters.
The aircraft detection points were obtained mostly outside the Ϫ3 dB perimeter of the antenna. The radar alarm sounded continuously until the aircraft exited the Ϫ3 dB perimeter of the beam. Secondary detections were occasionally made at or outside the Ϫ10 dB point as the aircraft receded from the beam. At the lower level, detections were made as close as 50 m to the radar, which represents over 1 s in flight time away from the site-a large interval relative to the electronic response time for automated laser shutdown.
The second experiment was conducted with a Cessna Citation, a popular business jet. Tests were completed between altitudes of 914 and 7620 m. The ground speed averaged 73 m͞s at the lowest level and 98 m͞s at the highest. Figure 4 shows the radar detection entrance and exit points for the Cessna Citation. At the lower levels, the detections were made near the Ϫ10 dB point of the antenna; that the detection points are located farther from the site than those for the helicopter data reflects the fact that the jet's radar cross section is comparatively larger. At the upper two levels the radar alarm sounded intermittently, and so only the entrance points could be recorded. Figure 5 provides a summary of the detection points in a vertical cross section and confirms that the Operational use of the radar has proved that it effectively detects aircraft passing overhead. Large commercial airliners are often observed near 11 km in altitude and cause strong continuous alarms. The maximum altitude to which we have detected an aircraft is 12.9 km.
Performance Modeling
The ultimate performance of the radar can be projected by fitting the radar equation to the measured data. The radar equation can be written as
where SNR is the mean signal-to-noise ratio, P t is the peak transmitted power, p is the pulse duration, f r is the pulse repetition frequency, P t p f r is the average power, G is the antenna gain, is the wavelength, is the X-band radar cross section of the target, d is the dwell (integration) time, R is the range, k B is Boltzmann's constant, T is the environmental temperature, F is the receiver noise figure, and L is the radar system loss constant. 13 Rearranging Eq. (1) with the position-dependent parameters on the lefthand side gives
where D is referred to as the radar detection constant. Figure 5 shows a contour of D ϭ 5 ϫ 10 Ϫ14 m
Ϫ4
, and the gray shading gives Ϯ4 ϫ 10 Ϫ14 m
. The curve well fits the jet data between 3048 and 7062 m. It does not fit the data at the lower altitudes, but this is to be expected since the radar was deliberately desensitized at the lower altitudes in order to avoid false near-field echoes.
With knowledge of the radar and horn parameters and the radar detection constant, we can determine the dwell time of the radar once the missing parameters are estimated. The mean signal-to-noise level when a target is initially detected is assumed to be 3 dB. The radar loss constant is estimated to be 1 dB and is due to atmospheric losses from oxygen and water vapor and from internal radar losses. 13 The X-band radar cross section is estimated as 60 m 2 , which is approximately the physical cross section of a Cessna Citation as viewed from below. Substitution of these parameters into Eq. (2) yields a dwell time of 8.9 ms.
The radar dwell time is unpublished, as are the details of the target detection algorithm, and neither could be obtained from the radar's manufacturer. However, for the beam width and rotation rate of the standard antenna, a single target would be transversed in 13.0 ms. It seems likely that the actual dwell time of the radar should be this number or somewhat lower, which is consistent with the value we have measured. The dwell time would have equaled 13 ms if the SNR was taken as 4.65 dB, the loss constant as 2.55 dB, or the radar cross section as 41 m 2 . These values represent small changes in each variable.
Given the stated radar parameters, the probability of detection for aircraft of various cross sections as a function of altitude can be determined. A Swerling Type I (i.e., Rayleigh-distributed) model of the radar cross section is assumed for aircraft that fluctuate slowly with respect to the dwell time of the radar, although a more appropriate and less conservative model for the near-specular broadside scattering may be the log-normal distribution. 14 For multiple pulses integrated during the dwell time d , the probability of detection P d for a Swerling Type I model is given by 13
where the incomplete gamma function ␥ is given by
where ⌫͑a͒ is the gamma function; n p is the number of pulses integrated during the dwell time d ; and Y b is the detection threshold for the test statistic, Y, which is the dimensionless matched-filter output signalenvelope energy, summed over n p pulses, and sampled when it is expected to peak in the absence of noise. Y b is related to the probability of false alarms, 13 P fa , by
P fa is defined as the probability that Y exceeds the threshold Y b when noise alone is present 13 and is related to the average time between false alarms, t fā , by
where r is the pulse repetition interval and n b is the number of range bins. 15 The number of range bins is given by
where B is the filter bandwidth and m is the measurement interval for a single pulse. 15 The measurement range is 15 km, which corresponds to a measurement interval of 100 s. The radar is operated in the 0.8 s mode, which has a filter bandwidth of 3 MHz, and so there are 300 range bins. The determination of an acceptable probability of false alarms is dependent on what can be tolerated by a particular system. In the actual radar this is determined by the threshold at which the detection trigger is set. A lower threshold leads to increased probability of detection, but each detection has a higher chance of being false. A higher threshold reduces the probability of detecting a target but ensures that each detection is more likely that of a real target. Assuming that one false alarm per 3 h of operation is tolerable leads to a false alarm probability of 2.6 ϫ 10
Ϫ9
. The detection threshold, Y b , is determined from the probability of false alarms by numerically inverting Eq. (5), and the detection probability for a single integration is then determined from Eq. (3). Figure 6 shows the single-integration detection probability as a function of altitude for both a Cessna Citation and a large-class aircraft. For this calculation, the dwell time was assumed to be 8.9 ms, the gain was set to 14 dB (i.e., 1.5 dB down from peak), and the large aircraft was assumed to have a radar cross section ten times greater than the Cessna Citation. For reference, a Boeing 747-400 has an underside physical cross section that is approximately 16 times larger than that of the Cessna Citation. Figure 6 shows that the single-integration detection probability is effectively 100% for the Cessna Citation at altitudes below a few kilometers and decreases rapidly above a 5 km altitude. This result agrees well with the observations that the radar alarm was triggered continuously at low altitudes but only intermittently at the upper levels. Figure 6 also shows that the probability of detecting a large aircraft is greater than that for the Cessna Citation at all altitudes, as expected. The single-integration probability of detection for large aircraft at an 11 km altitude is 75%, which is consistent with our observation that the radar alarm sounds continuously during large-aircraft overflights.
To determine whether an aircraft is detected during traversal of the radar beam and before the aircraft reaches the laser, we must determine the detection probability over multiple integration periods. This integrated probability is estimated by considering only the region within the Ϫ3 dB perimeter of the antenna pattern and by assigning it an average gain of 14 dB (i.e., 1.5 dB below peak gain). The dwell time is assumed to be 8.9 ms, and the number of integrations n i at each altitude is determined by assuming the aircraft travels at a 250 m͞s cruise speed. Under these assumptions, the probability of detecting an aircraft with a single pulse is constant for a given altitude, and so the probability of n or more detections (up to a maximum of n i ) can be obtained by appropriately integrating across the Gauss distribution. 16 Because the details of the radar detection algorithm are unknown, two different detection situations were tested. The most straightforward situation to test is the probability of one or more detections during traversal of the radar beam. A more conservative test for comparison is to determine the probability of detections at a rate of three per second or more. Figure 7 shows the detection probabilities for multiple integration periods. The results show that the Cessna Citation should almost always be observed at altitudes below 13 km for one or more detections, or at altitudes below 11 km for the more conservative three detections per second or more. The large aircraft should be observed up to at least a 21 km altitude in either case.
The parameters used in the above calculations were set to conservative values, and the curves in Figure 7 provide reasonable expected limits for the radar's performance. If a less conservative 13 ms dwell time is used, then the Cessna Citation curves in Figure 7 move up by 0.5 km. Similarly, the maximum detection altitude increases if the aircraft speed is reduced, the detection trigger threshold is decreased, or the log-normal distribution for aircraft crosssection fluctuations is used.
Risk Analysis
A typical maximum altitude for jet aircraft, including the Cessna Citation and Boeing 747-400, is 13.7 km. The results of Section 4 show that the probability of detection for most targets of interest is high. In particular, the large aircraft responsible for commercial passenger transport should always be detected throughout their operational altitude range.
There are, however, certain situations in which aircraft might elude the radar detection system. For example, it is possible to deliberately circumvent radar detection by flying very low and fast. It has been noted before that this is the standard mode of attack for fighter aircraft and that deliberate circumvention in this way cannot be easily avoided. 9 Another class of aircraft that presents a challenge includes small and fast business jets that fly at high altitudes, such as the Cessna Citation. These jets typically fly fastest near 10.7 km in altitude, and so would be expected to cruise primarily near that altitude; the results shown in Fig. 7 suggest that such aircraft should be detected. Overpasses at higher altitudes, however, might elude detection.
The probability of an overpass without detection by the radar can be determined, although the calculations are specific to particular locations. The primary aircraft of concern at Dalhousie University, located in the city of Halifax (Canada), are high-altitude commercial jets traveling in the major flight corridor between North America and Europe, and low-flying helicopters operated by local hospitals. In contrast, MIT Haystack Observatory is located in a semirural area where commercial aircraft fly to the south on their approach to Boston's Logan International Airport. A greater concern at the MIT site is the high number of small private aircraft, including stunt planes. During nighttime operations, these aircraft are often witnessed to steer directly toward the radar beam.
In all cases at both sites, the radar has performed as an excellent countermeasure to aircraft overflights during tests and regular operations. We therefore focus on the challenging case of high-flying small jet aircraft in the major flight corridor above Halifax.
During periods of high traffic, the radar in Halifax detects aircraft near 11 km in altitude at a rate of 1 per every 3 h. By taking the width of the radar beam at the 11 km height as 2040 m and the body width of a large aircraft as 6.5 m, the probability that an aircraft's fuselage would pass directly over the laser beam is 0.001 h
Ϫ1
, or once per every 1000 h. One thousand hours represents nearly 3 h of observations per day for an entire year, which is a very high level of operation for a typical high-power lidar system. For example, one of the longest-serving lidars is at the Utah Facility for Remote Sensing, which operated for 2200 h during the ten year subperiod from 1986 to 1996, for an average of 0.6 h of observation per day. 17 Another is the middle atmosphere lidar at Observatoire de Haute Provence in France, which obtained 1244 nights of measurement during the twelve years from 1984 to 1995 (Ref. 18); if we assume an average measurement time of 5 h, this leads to an average of 1.4 h͞day. Thus, even in the absence of safety measures, it should be clear that the probability of acci- dently illuminating an aircraft from below by a typical high-power lidar system is low for this kind of air traffic.
The Cloud and Radiation Testbed Raman lidar (CARL) at the Southern Great Plains site, however, provides a worst-case situation. CARL is a fully automated turn-key system, 2 and from January 1998 through March 2000 it was operational 51% of the time. 19 This lidar is very atypical, and laser failures are the primary reason for extended system downtime. Given the aircraft statistics above Halifax, an automated system like CARL would expect a direct aircraft overflight during operations once every 2.8 months.
Next consider the number of jet aircraft currently in service: For 2002, the most recent year for which data are reported, there were 6210 jet aircraft operated by large U.S. air carriers and regionalcommuter operators, and 8355 general aviation and air taxi jets. These aircraft flew 18.6 and 2.7 million hours, respectively. 20 From these numbers, we can estimate that small jets account for up to 13% of the total jet aircraft traffic.
From the occurrence rate of jet aircraft flying over the Dalhousie lidar site, the chances of a small jet passing over the site is therefore about one every 10,000 h. This is a number that is comparable with the operational lifetime of a typical long-lived highpower lidar system and, for an atypical worst-case situation such as CARL, would represent only one occurrence every two years or more. Detections with the radar will reduce the probability of a small aircraft overflight even further, but to what degree depends on the specific distribution of flight altitudes. Below about 11 km we expect small jets to be detected, but above that altitude the success rate may decrease. It should be kept in mind that conservative estimates were used for the parameters in the radar equation, and so the actual detection capabilities may be better than what is presented here. Nevertheless, it has been remarked that modeling is basically a coarse procedure, 14 and so results should always be considered with care.
Furthermore, this analysis is valid only insofar as its basic assumptions are true. Lidar sites in the path of approach to an airport might have considerably higher rates of overpass by small aircraft, which must be compared against the higher detection rate at low altitudes. It must also be stressed that the detection algorithm for the radar is unpublished. We have made reasonable estimates for the various parameters, but they are only estimates and may vary for any given system.
Discussion and Conclusions
The modified X-band radar described here has proved to be an effective aircraft-protection device when used in conjunction with atmospheric lidar systems. Measurements of aircraft position with GPS between altitudes of 457 and 7620 m show that the aircraft are first detected between the Ϫ10 dB and the Ϫ3 dB points of the antenna gain pattern, which provides sufficient time for automated shutoff of the transmitted laser beam. Routine measurements in Halifax typically identify aircraft near an 11 km altitude and have been observed as high as a 12.9 km altitude. Large commercial airliners are often observed, and they cause in strong continuous alarms. These results are in good agreement with those from the system at Langley Research Center, 9 upon which the design of this new system was based. Their system was successfully tested against a variety of different aircraft flying between altitudes of 304 and 6553 m, and the lowest overpasses were conducted at a high speed of 100 m͞s.
Modeled projections of the radar's performance show that it should detect large commercial aircraft throughout their operational altitude range. The sensitivity of the radar to smaller business-class jets is lower, but a risk analysis indicates that the probability of accidental illumination with a laser is low. It should be noted that the illumination of a large aircraft by a vertically pointing laser would likely go unnoticed by the pilot: The lidar systems described here are not powerful enough to damage an aircraft but are an eye-safety hazard when viewed on axis.
It should be possible to employ this radar with lidars in situations other than vertical pointing. The lidar at MIT used a steerable telescope, and the radar was mounted on the telescope chassis so that the radar and lidar beams could be kept coaxial; the waveguide was used to position the gain horn at the center of the 1.2 m wide laser beam. Although the lidar was not operated away from zenith, it was found that once the elevation of the telescope was dropped below about 45°, the radar's alarm would sound. The low elevation angle detections were most likely due to ground clutter in the radar's sidelobes. Thus it is important to pay attention to the radar antenna pattern to select an antenna that minimizes any sidelobes in directions where ground clutter may be an issue.
Operation of the radar from an aircraft in the upward direction should be straightforward, whereas pointing downward might pose unexpected challenges that we have not evaluated in this paper. Operation from an aircraft will also need to accommodate the relative motion of the aircraft, whereas our results are from a stationary ground station.
The gain horn used in this study represents a good trade-off between beam width and maximum detection altitude. A gain horn with a larger beam width might result in detections at greater horizontal distance from the laser beam; however, the larger beam width would result in lower gain, lower overall sensitivity, and lower maximum detection range. These losses can be overcome with a more powerful radar transmitter, but at considerable extra expense.
Although there are no known incidents of aircraft illumination by a research lidar system, it is incumbent upon the research community to ensure that no such accidents happen. The X-band radar system described here provides an excellent approach to the aircraft-protection problem and has been used with the appropriate licenses at sites in both the U.S. and Canada.
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